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The outlook of Turkish foreign and security policy (TFSP) 
Straddling Europe and Asia, Turkey sits on a strategic piece of land at the intersection of 
Europe, Asia and Africa, in the vicinity of significant trade routes, energy corridors and 
conflict-ridden regions, namely the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. The Turkish 
Straits pass through the larger Asian peninsula (Anatolia) and the smaller European 
peninsula (Thrace), connecting the Black Sea in the North to the Mediterranean Sea in 
the South, via the Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea. Turkey shares borders with Bulgaria 
and Greece in the West; Georgia, Armenia and Iran in the East; and Syria and Iraq in the 
Southeast.  
 Turkey’s foreign and security policy (TFSP) is shaped by its geography, history, 
the structure of Turkish domestic politics, and international context. It has evolved since 
the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 by international and/or domestic factors.1  
Turkey’s history dates back to the Ottoman Empire, which had an influence over 
the evolution and formation of the current Turkish foreign and security policy. The 
Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 forms one of the founding documents, and is signed by 
the founders of modern Turkey, annulling the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, which was signed 
by the Ottoman State, partitioning the Ottoman land between the victors of World War I. 
The founder of Turkey is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who embedded the principle of 
“Peace at Home, Peace in the World” to Turkey’s foreign policy. It means that stability 
and security in Turkey and those in the region are connected and mutually dependent. 
                                                 
1 For a detailed account of Turkish foreign policy since the 19th century, See Cengiz Okman, “Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003”, in Idris Bal ed., Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold 
War Era, Boca Raton: BrownWalker Press, 2004, pp. 5-26. 
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Therefore when Turkey, which embodies several ethnically and religiously diverse 
peoples, enjoys domestic stability and security, i.e. territorial and social integrity, it 
would generate the same for the region. Likewise, the security and stability in the region 
would reflect itself on the domestic situation in Turkey. Atatürk completed this 
framework by establishing the new regime on the basis of Turkish nationalism- defined 
not by ethnicity but by citizenship- and secularism, to maintain territorial and social 
integrity for a country, which did not have any previous experience of the rule by and of 
people. Thus, the main referents of domestic security are these two pillars: nationalism 
and secularism. The nature of civil-military relations in Turkey is an extension of the role 
of the military to defend these values under Constitutional provisions.  
Whereas in Western practice, the military is an instrument of politics2, in Turkey 
it is regarded as part of it. It has been expected to intervene or influence politics should 
the civilian government fall short of maintaining the Republican regime, or worse, pose a 
threat to it by challenging either the nationalist or the secular basis of the state.3 Although 
this makes Turkey less than a democracy, it guarantees the level of democracy that 
Turkey has achieved so far; because in other cases, territorial and social integrity would 
be at stake, and it would not be possible to talk about democracy where there is no 
security. Specifically, in the current era, Turkey’s domestic threat perceptions emanate 
from terrorism by separatist Kurdish groups (namely the PKK, and later PKK-
                                                 
2 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
3 See Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “The Anatomy of Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, (January 1997), pp. 151-166. 
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KONGRAGEL), and Islamic movements which reject a secular regime and which are 
critical of Turkey’s strong ties with the West.   
At the international level, TFSP was influenced by the developments in and 
characteristics of the interwar period, Cold War, post-Cold War and post-September 114 
periods. Since its establishment, Turkey sought security through alliances, and devoted its 
efforts particularly to embrace the West. During the interwar era, it established alliances 
and signed friendship agreements in the Middle East. After World War II, Turkey aspired 
to join NATO against the looming Soviet threat, and became a member of the North 
Atlantic Alliance in 1952. As a result, NATO membership established a long-lasting 
institutional and functional link with the West.5   
Turkey became member to the United Nations in 1945, the Council of Europe in 
1949, and associate member of the European Economic Community in 1963. Turkey is 
also a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC).  
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey engaged in a renewed effort for 
membership to the European Union, and also took regional initiatives to establish the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) and the Naval Task Force for the 
Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR) among the littoral states aimed at responding ‘soft 
                                                 
4 The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, will be referred to as 9/11. 
5 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Fall 2000), pp. 109, 209 
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security’ issues. Turkey founded the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with 
Iran and Pakistan, which was expanded with the membership of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan 
and Central Asian Republics. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports 
Caspian oil via Georgia and Turkey to western markets (officially inaugurated in May 
2005), is a politically, strategically and economically significant project that is based on 
regional cooperation. 
 
TFSP in the post-Cold War 
During the Cold War, crisis management and prevention was basically handled by 
superpowers or great powers in order to prevent an escalation that would lead to a nuclear 
standoff. Thus, regional powers did not always need to take initiatives or even to express 
a clear stance since the superpowers of each camp determined the course of policies. The 
end of the Cold War increased the significance of regional security issues as the influence 
of superpowers either decreased or disappeared in addressing security issues or conflicts. 
Situated in the middle of the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea regions, Turkey is affected by or is part of regional security issues. Thus, it 
sought to enhance its influence to pursue its interests, and in this process, it prioritized 
multilateralism and acting within alliances in its foreign policy and military strategy.6  
The outstanding issues in Turkey’s foreign policy in this period were the new 
security risks in the Middle East, Balkans and Southern Caucasus, such as 
ethnic/intrastate conflicts, migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
                                                 
6 “Turkey’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy”, White Paper, Part Four, Section One, Ministry of 
National Defense, 2000. 
 7 
their delivery systems, illicit trade of arms and drugs; and relations with the European 
Union, former Soviet republics, and energy issues.  
 During the Cold War and extending to the post-Cold War period, two main 
security issues were standing out in TFSP: Relations with Greece regarding Cyprus and 
the Aegean, and its uneasy relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors regarding 
terrorism, water, border issues and mutual perceptions of ideological threat. Turkey 
maintained strategic balance with Greece by keeping its troops in Northern Cyprus to 
prevent a change of the status quo in the Aegean and Cyprus. In the Middle East, military 
power was favorable vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq and roughly the same with Iran. More 
importantly, its NATO guarantee constituted the main deterrent against any 
unconventional attack with ballistic missiles from these states.  
NATO remained the cornerstone of Turkey’s defense policy after the Cold War, 
because of its role not only in European security but also in out-of-area conflicts. The fall 
of the Soviet Union removed the nuclear threat, but at the same time created many other 
issues that led to instability. Furthermore, these issues required more than maintaining 
ultimate material capabilities. Thus, while Turkey continued to enjoy the NATO 
collective defense guarantee with the nuclear option, it aimed at pursuing an active policy 
in its region, to prevent or alleviate the adverse affects of instability in the Balkans, Black 
Sea, Caucasus and the Middle East.  
NATO strategy evolved throughout the Cold War from “massive retaliation” to 
“forward defense”, making its European allies uneasy about the US commitment to the 
continental security. “Out-of-area” operations was another matter that concerned 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, because the commitment had been vague regarding the 
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defense of Turkey if the country incurred an attack from the Eastern borders. The end of 
the Cold War neither led to the end of the Alliance nor its nuclear policy. By the CFE 
(Conventional Forces Europe) Treaty, Turkey shifted its troops from the West to its 
Eastern and Southeastern regions, thereby providing a more credible deterrent.7  
The out-of-area issue in NATO, and Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East 
were highlighted during the Gulf War of 1991 (and later in 2003 Iraq Operation): The 
1991 Gulf War was the first significant challenge to Turkey’s security policy when Iraqi 
forces invaded Kuwait and an international coalition intervened to restore the situation. 
NATO’s collective defense commitment was questioned, and Turkey had to revise its 
“cautious indifference” for Middle Eastern issues. Turkey had pursued a policy of 
nonintervention toward the Middle East, but as a result of the war, it took sides with the 
international coalition led by the United States.8 After the inspections in Iraq, which 
revealed the weapons of mass destruction capability and particularly nuclear program, 
Turkey started to pursue an active policy in the Middle East: It engaged in strategic 
relations with the United States and Israel and signed military cooperation agreements 
including participation in missile defense projects.9 Turkey was able to continue with its 
                                                 
7 See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Defense Reform in Turkey,” in Istvan Gyarmati and 
Theodor Winkler (eds.), Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United 
States, Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002, pp. 135-164. 
8 Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Redefinition of Turkish Security Policies in the Middle East After the Cold 
War,” in in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security 
Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 213-232. 
9 See Şebnem Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense,” Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 4, No.3, (Autumn 2003), pp. 71-102. 
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security and defense policy-deterrence, alliances, forward defense- despite the various 
security risks and threats to its national interests.  
Following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, several ethnic strives or 
intrastate conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus posed a new challenge to 
international peace and security. These conflicts resulted in migration and refugees, 
environmental issues, human trafficking and illicit trade of arms and drugs. Therefore, 
new policies and strategies were adopted; in this sense, peace operations mandated by the 
United Nations and undertaken by either the UN or regional organizations assumed 
importance to address these challenges. Turkey participated in various UN, NATO and 
EU-led missions. Turkey contributed to UN peacekeeping missions with over 300 
civilian police, and to humanitarian assistance in international and bilateral aid efforts.10 
Turkey’s contribution to the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans was very important 
for the success of the mission, since the local people welcomed the Turkish troops 
because of the positive memories back in Ottoman times.  
Relations with the European Union, those with former Soviet republics, and 
energy issues were items on top of the foreign policy agenda. Turkey’s relations with the 
EU in this period was marked by renewed vigor for membership, intensified social and 
trade relations with the former Soviet republics, and Turkey’s role in the transportation of 
Caspian hydrocarbon resources from the landlocked region to European markets via its 
Mediterranean port, Ceyhan. Therefore, Turkey’s foreign policy evolved from being 
                                                 
10  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm> 
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shaped by military and political interests, to one that also included economic and social 
levels.  
 
The challenge of 9/11 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States led to a new definition of 
threat and response in international security and affected international politics 
dramatically, whose effects are still seen today mainly as a result of the policies that the 
United States pursued from then on. After 9/11, a new type of war was defined between 
the “West” under the leadership of the United States and the value systems it represents 
(democracy, liberal economy, human rights, freedom) vs. those non-state groups that 
aspire to demolish this political, economic and value system which is claimed to bring all 
the inequality, suppression and “evil”. The statements and background of the terrorist 
networks suggested that they also sought nuclear capability to strike these nations and 
homelands.11 The international community and certainly the United States responded to 
the events of 9/11 by redefining urgent threats and devised policy options to address 
them. In the rush of waging the “war against terror”, multilateralism in decision-making 
and implementation was ranked second to unilateral responses against urgent threats; 
military measures were prioritized over diplomacy, and the use of nuclear weapons was 
included in security policy. 
Right after the events of 9/11, international community united in extending 
support to the United States for the operation in Afghanistan: As a member of NATO, 
                                                 
11 See Adam Dolnik, “America’s Worst Nightmare? Osama bin Laden and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
PIR Center, September 12, 2001. 
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Turkey took the command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 
first between June 2002 and February 2003 (ISAF II) and later between February and 
August 2005 (ISAF VII) for a total of 14 months in 3 years. Similar to its role in the 
Balkans, Turkish troops are welcome in Afghanistan, mainly because they are Muslim.  
On the other hand, the decision to attack Iraq on the rationale that the Iraqi regime 
under Saddam Hussein had clandestine weapons of mass destruction to be used against 
the United States and its allies, caused rifts as to whether the threat was imminent, i.e. 
justifying a war; and whether it was legitimate, i.e. without authorization by the United 
Nations. For the United States, swift action was necessary, therefore, there was no time to 
be spent to reach consensus. As a result of this position, which did not observe the 
interests and concerns of the allies it sought support for the operation, and the extension 
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with thousands of civil and military casualties, 
criticisms intensified and eventually opened up a wave of anti-Americanism (even in 
allied countries), which was exactly what the United States was trying to prevent in order 
to address the terrorist challenge. 
The developments and the new international security environment after 9/11 as 
well as the foreign and security policy of the United States had severe impacts on Turkey: 
Taking the side of the United States made Turkey the target of two terrorist attacks in 
November 2003 in Istanbul. The policies of the Bush administration, which designated a 
world of “good vs. evil”12, narrowed the room of maneuver of the allies, who might have 
                                                 
12 President Bush’s Remarks, Address to a Joint Session to the Congress and American People, United 
States Capitol, Washington, D.C. , September 20, 2001. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> 
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been willing to take sides with the United States, but whose national interests would not 
let them do so.13 It was one of these instances when Turkey had given a historic decision 
by not letting the US troops use Turkish territory to attack Iraq from the North in March 
2003. In an allied country which has been a staunch member of NATO, anti-
Americanism reached its peak, especially after the 4 July 2003 Suleymaniyah incident, 
when the US troops detained Turkish special forces in Iraq’s north on incomplete 
intelligence. This caused outrage in the public, and became a social phenomenon14. The 
post-war conflict in Iraq affected Turkish economic and domestic security situation due 
to terrorist infiltrations from Iraq’s north, and decreasing levels of economic activity.  
The main area of discontent between Turkey and the United States has been that, 
while the United States is reluctant to fight against the Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK, 
which finds shelter in Iraq’s north, it prevents Turkey to carry out a unilateral cross-
border military operation to address its security concerns. There are mainly two reasons: 
First, on March 1, 2003 the Turkish Parliament rejected the motion to allow the US 
troops to use Turkish territory for a northern front in Iraq, which not only caused 
disappointment on the part of the United States, but also dependency on the Kurdish 
groups in the north. Second, the United States would avoid disturbing the relative 
stability in the north by Turkey’s military operation, because it would lead to the total 
failure of the US operation in Iraq.  
                                                 
13 See Idris Bal, “Turkey-USA Relations and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War,” in Idris Bal ed., Turkish Foreign 
Policy…, pp. 119-152.  
14 The movie titled “Valley of the Wolves: Iraq” which took this incident as its starting point was watched 
by more than 4 million people, the highest number of spectators in the Turkish movie industry. 
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The other pressing issue on Turkey’s agenda is Iran’s nuclear program, over 
which concerns mounted after 2003. The impacts of the policies of the Bush 
administration were also felt in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime: After 
9/11, President G.W. Bush talked of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the “axis of evil”. The 
discourse justifies any action by the United States to fight against these states which pose 
a serious threat. The reflection of this policy on these states has been a knee-jerk reaction 
of guarding against a possible US operation. As a result, North Korea withdrew from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and carried out a nuclear test, and there are 
suspicions that Iran aspires to become a nuclear power. 
Turkey is concerned about a change in the military balance in the region by the 
acquisition of nuclear arms by a regional power, like Iran. Turkey and Iran have 
maintained good relations despite several issues, but the absence of conflict owes to the 
strategic balance between the two neighbors regarding the constituents of their power 
base. If Iran goes nuclear, it will not only change regional balances, but also undermine 
the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, thereby stimulating drives for 
armament. Therefore, the handling of the situation with Iran is vitally important for 
Turkey as well as regional and international security.  
Overall, in the current security situation, Turkey is in a very special position by 
being a country with a population 99% of which is Muslim, and at the same time a 
secular country with Western orientation. It not only is a geographical but a cultural 
bridge between continents and civilizations, so it has much to offer to refute the thesis of 
“clash of civilizations”. Accordingly, Turkey seeks to foster a culture of understanding 
and cooperation between civilizations. In February 2002, Turkey hosted a joint forum 
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with the EU and OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) In addition, Turkey and Spain 
co-sponsor a new initiative, called “Alliance of Civilizations” launched by the United 
Nations Secretary General in July 2005.15  
 
Relations with allies, regional policies and issue areas in Turkish foreign policy 
Turkish foreign policy is formulated and shaped by several variables ranging from 
military, political and economic interests, to regional and social concerns. Turkey’s 
geography not only sits between two continents, but also two different security and 
political structures in these regions: Turkey is both part of Europe and European security 
system, which has been shaped on liberal principles (avoiding war and promoting 
cooperation) since the end of World War II, and the Middle East (or its Eastern and 
Southeastern borders), where security and perceptions are still defined in Realist terms 
(Reelpolitik). Therefore, memberships to international organizations and cooperation are 
as important as alliances in Turkey’s foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey attaches utmost 
importance to its relations with the United States and the European Union. As Atatürk’s 
famous dictum “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” establishes the domestic and 
regional links in security, Turkish foreign policy agenda includes the following regions 
and issue areas: The Middle East and Iraq, terrorism, Cyprus and Greece, Southern 
Caucasus, Russia, Central Asia, energy resources and the Balkans.16 Regarding security, 
Turkey has contributed to peacekeeping, and arms control and disarmament efforts.  
 
                                                 
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm> 
16 ibid. 
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Relations with the United States: 
Turkish-US relations were dealt to a great extent in the previous section, but it should be 
underlined here that these relations are based on strong ties of alliance, and that both 
countries are indispensable for each other. These relations are not limited to military and 
political, but include economic and social realms. The United States has supported 
Turkey’s membership to the EU, has worked towards a comprehensive settlement on the 
island of Cyprus, and has provided support in economic terms, particularly through the 
IMF. After 9/11, the number of exchange students from both countries was increased so 
as to promote dialogue and understanding at the social, cultural and intellectual level.  
 
Relations with the European Union:  
Turkey’s association with the EU was established by the Ankara Agreement of 1963. 
Turkey applied for full membership in 1987 and completed a Customs Union in 1995. It 
was officially recognized as a candidate at the Helsinki European Council in 1999. The 
European Commission Progress report of October 2004, acknowledged that Turkey 
satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended the opening of accession 
negotiations. The Brussels European Council of December 2004 concluded that the 
European Union would open accession negotiations with Turkey, and on 3 October 2005, 
accession process was launched in Luxembourg Intergovernmental Conference.  
Turkey’s EU membership bid has been a contentious issue, which cannot be 
studied in a short piece as this one.17 An outstanding argument in the debate is that 
                                                 
17 See Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1997. 
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Turkey is not and should not be a part of Europe, because it neither geographically nor 
culturally belongs to Europe. In fact, several of the issues that mark Turkish-EU relations 
is related to this very point. In addition, Turkey is a hard case that extends the “absorption 
capacity” of the Union: Geographically, Europe has perceived Turkey as a buffer against 
the security risks emanating from the East, and if Turkey becomes a member, the EU will 
have borders in a volatile region like the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey has a population 
around 70 million, which would affect decision-making in EU bodies. Around 60% of 
this population is composed of young people, and this worries Europeans about an 
immigrant influx demanding jobs. Socially and intellectually, Turkish immigrants in 
Europe preserved their distinct identity and culture18, which also concerns European 
policymakers about an overriding social change should Turkey become a member. These 
points are met with arguments on the advantages that Turkey’s membership would 
provide in terms of security, particularly in the post-9/11 world (that is, Turkey’s 
membership to the EU as a Muslim country), the dynamic young population for the 
economies of the aging Europe, the bridge-role in terms of relations with lucrative 
markets in the former Soviet Union, and in terms of energy projects.  
The membership of the Greek Cypriot Administration (recognized as the 
government of Cyprus) stands as one of the major stumbling blocks in front of the 
accession process, because Turkey does not legally recognize it as the “Republic of 
Cyprus,” and does not ratify the Protocol which extends the Customs Union to all 
                                                 
18 Fulya Kip Barnard, “The Role of Turkish Migration and Migrants in Turkey’s Relations With the 
EC/EU,” in Idris Bal ed. Turkish Foreign Policy…, pp.181-195. 
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members. The recognition issue is related to the much broader conflict between Greece, 
Cyprus and Turkey19, which will be presented in more detail below.  
 
Greece and Cyprus: 
Despite many commonalities in history and culture, the rivalry over the strategic balance 
in the Aegean and the Mediterranean put Turkey and Greece in conflict regarding 
political and military issues. The main issue areas between Turkey and Greece are the 
continental shelf and FIR (Flight Information Region) zone in the Aegean, the 
militarization of the Aegean islands, and Cyprus. To preserve its strategic situation in the 
Seas, Turkey refuses to extend the continental shelf from six to twelve miles, and the FIR 
zone to ten miles, as opposed to Greece, which extended them on the basis of 
international conventions. Turkey also opposes the militarization of the Aegean islands 
under Greek sovereignty, because it is against the Lausanne Convention. However, 
Greece argues that it acquired the islands from Italy, and not Turkey.20  
The dispute over Cyprus also concerns strategic balance in Eastern 
Mediterranean. After decolonization, Greece, Turkey and the UK became guarantor 
states and a state was established on the island, composed of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 
As a result of intercommunal atrocities, Turkey intervened in 1974 on the basis of the 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the issue, See Tarık Oğuzlu, “The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: The Prospects of 
Reconciliation?” in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), The Europeanization of Turkey’s 
Security Policy…pp. 257-282. 
20 For more details on the legal aspect of the issue, See Yüksel Đnan and Yücel Acer, “The Aegean 
Disputes,” in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security 
Policy…, pp. 125-157 
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guarantorship agreements, and the island was divided between Turks in the north and 
Greeks in the south, with UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus) to separate the conflicting 
parties. With no comprehensive settlement since that time, the issue acquired social and 
economic dimensions in addition to military and political.  
Turkey’s policy to maintain the strategic balance with Greece was the existence of 
Turkish troops in the north: Should Greece attempt to change the status quo in the 
Aegean, Turkish troops would threaten southern Cyprus. However, the prospect of 
Cyprus’ membership to the EU presented a serious issue, because via the EU, The Greek 
Cypriot administration would be able to exert more pressure on Turkey to recognize it as 
the sole government of the island, and to be forced to withdraw troops from the island. 
This indeed, is the current situation. To find a solution, the then UN Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan, came up with a plan bearing his name, which was submitted to referenda in 
the North and South Cyprus in April 2004. The plan foresaw a settlement that would 
provide for the accession of a united Cyprus to the EU. While the Turkish Cypriots voted 
in favor, the Greek Cypriots voted against.  
On May 1, when Cyprus became an EU member, the entire balance on the island 
was upset: The Greek Cypriot administration acquired veto power regarding decisions on 
Turkey, an accession country, in order to induce the latter to accept a resolution in favor 
of its interests. However, the issue is too complicated to be resolved within the EU, and 
Turkey preserves its position that the issue be resolved under the auspices of the UN. The 
accession talks were made conditional upon the resolution of the issue, and it is a bone of 
contention between the EU and Turkey. 
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 Although they were NATO allies, Turkish-Greek relations were marked by 
tension. There was a rapprochement in Turkish-Greek relations starting from 1998 and 
increasing in 1999 as a result of the earthquakes in both countries and mutual aid efforts. 
Thanks to the efforts of respective foreign ministers of both countries, around 30 
agreements were concluded in areas like trade, tourism, environment, culture, energy, 
transportation and security related issues; and confidence-building measures were 
adopted. This period also witnessed several high level contacts and reciprocal visits.  
 
The Middle East: 
Turkey has historical and cultural ties with the countries and peoples of the region, and 
the instability in the region has adverse affects, which leads Turkey to have an interest in 
the resolution of issues. The Middle East is marked by protracted conflicts, like the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, which involves all states in the Middle East, and several issues 
whose solutions are linked to each other: Water, weapons of mass destruction, territorial 
disputes, terrorism, etc… to name a few. Turkey has expressed its readiness to provide 
facilitation or mediation. In 2005, it launched the Ankara Forum, between Israel, 
Palestinian Authority and Turkey to promote economic and commercial relations. 
Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria, 
were shaped by disputes over water resources, terrorism, border issues, and mutual threat 
perceptions due to state regimes. Turkey could address these issues by either promoting 
cooperation, such as in water dispute, or coercion, particularly to deal with terrorist 
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infiltrations from these countries.21 Currently, the main issues are the situation in Iraq and 
Iran’s nuclear program.22  
 Four years after the military operation in Iraq in March 2003 by the US-led 
coalition, post-conflict restructuring and peacemaking processes are halted by sectarian 
violence. Security is still the primary issue, which impedes political processes that would 
engender stability in the country. The riches of the country and the vulnerabilities to 
outside influence cause regional and international concerns. Turkey is opposed to the 
disintegration of the country on the basis of ethnic or sectarian terms, because the 
territorial and social unity are not only vital for the country itself, but also for stability 
and peace in the region and beyond.  
 Turkey’s primary concern about Iraq emanates from its northern region: Turkey 
suffered from PKK terrorism since early 1980s. The terrorist organization carried 
guerrilla warfare in Turkey’s southeast claiming 30,000 lives. Its ultimate aim is to 
establish an independent Kurdish state in this region. Turkey has incurred terrorist 
infiltrations from Iraq’s north before the War, but it had an agreement with the Iraqi 
government for hot pursuit down to 5 kilometers past the border. After the Gulf War of 
1991, Turkey retained the right for this option to fight against the PKK. However, now 
that it is only Iraq’s north which enjoys a relative stability and security, Iraq and the 
                                                 
21 For an overview on Turkey’s relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey’s security policy, See Şebnem 
Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East:…”  
22 For an analysis on Iran’s nuclear program on Turkey’s non-nuclear weapon policy, See Şebnem Udum 
Turkey’s Non-Nuclear Weapon Status: A Theoretical Assessment, Paper presented at the 2006 ISYP 
Conference, 9-10 November 2006 Cairo, Egypt. < http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/56/papers1-8.htm> 
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United States vehemently oppose Turkey’s possible cross-border military operation to 
chase the terrorists, or to prevent their infiltration. The tripartite dialogue mechanism 
established between Iraq, Turkey and the United States is far from satisfying Turkey’s 
concerns and allowing the actions that it sees fit to deal with the terrorist threat. The 
statements of the Kurdish leaders in Iraq regarding the establishment of an independent 
state in Iraq’s north is alarming for Turkey, because it is perceived as a threat to the 
country’s territorial integrity by paving the way to similar claims for Turkey’s southeast 
region. Thus, the issue concerns Turkey’s vital national interests, and is a top priority 
item in foreign policy. 
 The other important issue regarding Iraq is the future of Kirkuk. The region is not 
only significant because of oil, but also the existence of Turcoman population. The 
control of Kirkuk is critical, and the monopoly of political or administrative rule would 
start a new wave of conflict over the control of oil. Turkey is in favor of a joint 
administrative structure in order to achieve stability.   
 
Terrorism: 
Before 9/11, terrorism was defined in a narrower scope and with specific targets. In this 
sense, Turkey incurred terrorist attacks from the PKK, a separatist/terrorist organization 
and the DHKP-C, an extreme leftist organization against military or civilian targets. 9/11 
opened up a new era of an apocalyptic war between “the West” and “terrorists”. While 
there is no single definition of terrorism, it is hard to fight against this new type, and as 
mentioned above, the allies of the United States, including Turkey, suffered from terrorist 
attacks because they were on the side of the former. Having suffered from a two-decade 
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long terrorism problem, Turkey does not differentiate in urgency of action regarding the 
types of terrorism.  
 
The Russian Federation, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Energy: 
Throughout history, relations with Russia have traditionally been very important, and 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these relations were expanded to include new 
foreign policy items on the conflicts in Southern Caucasus, relations with the Central 
Asian Turkic republics and transportation routes of energy resources. 23  
Turkey and Russia cooperate in the fields of economy and energy. Turkey gets a 
considerable portion of its natural gas from Russia. In Southern Caucasus, Turkey has 
close relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, mainly in economic and energy realms. 
Turkey’s relations with Armenia are still short of formal diplomatic relations, and the 
allegations of the Armenian diaspora constitute one of the main roadblocks. Turkey’s 
invitation to establish a joint commission composed of historians of the respective nations 
for research was not enthusiastically received. 
The close cultural and historical ties with the Central Asian republics paved the 
way for trade relations, and Turkey’s extension of support in their democratic and 
economic development in financial terms, technical assistance, civil and military 
assistance and training, scholarships, etc…24 There are several investments by Turkish 
firms mainly in the construction sector.  
                                                 
23 See Victor Panin and Henry Paniev, “Turkey and Russia,” in Idris Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy…, pp. 
253-267; See Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and the Caucasus,” ibid, pp. 269-289; See Gül Turan, Đlter Turan and 
Đdris Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the Turkic Republics,” ibid., pp. 292-326 
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Turkey does not have sufficient oil or gas reserves for domestic consumption, but 
its geography is advantageous for transportation routes for the Middle Eastern and 
Caspian oil. It has received oil through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline from Iraq to its 
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, and natural gas from Iran. Regarding the transportation of 
oil and gas reserves in the Caspian basin, there were several proposed routes,25 and 
Turkey was in favor of a Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that would bypass the 
Turkish Straits to prevent environmental hazards and to threaten the safety of the 
inhabitants of Istanbul, considering the already heavy tanker traffic in the Straits.  
 
The Balkans: 
 Turkey has historical and cultural ties with the Balkans. The ethnic and religious borders 
do not coincide with state borders in the region, which provides a fertile ground for 
conflicts, particularly after the Cold War. Peace and stability in the region is very 
important in the Balkans, because the final destination of a movement of people as a 
result of ethnic conflicts is in Turkey. Thus, Turkey has not only aimed at the cessation of 
hostilities, but enduring stability.26 
Regarding conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Turkey participated in NATO 
operations, peacekeeping missions and reconstruction efforts. Turkey contributes to 
                                                 
25 For a detailed analysis of the transportation of Caspian oil and its link with Turkish foreign policy, See 
Şebnem Udum, “The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Resources: A Challenge for Turkish Foreign 
Policy,” Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VI, (December 2001-February 2002), available 
at <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume6/December2001-February2002/sebnemudum.PDF> 
26 See Mustafa Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and 
Security,” in Idris Bal ed. Turkish Foreign Policy…, pp. 197-209. 
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KFOR and UNMIK (the UN Police Mission in Kosovo), the EU police mission (EUPM) 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU-led Proxima in Macedonia, and the EUFOR-ALTHEA, 
which replaced SFOR in 2004. Turkey launched the Southeastern European Cooperation 
Process (SEECP), and the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe 
(MPFSEE)/Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Turkey acts in regional economic 
initiatives and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI).27 
 
International security: Peace operations, Arms control and Disarmament, 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Peace operations, which were formulated during the Cold War to prevent a superpower 
nuclear standoff, evolved in the post-Cold War period, particularly to address the regional 
conflicts with the involvement of regional organizations mandated by the UN. New 
issues require multilateral efforts and more than military measures, increasing the 
relevance of peace operations. These are long-lasting missions and for the success of the 
operation, the multilateral force should be welcome in the country. Turkey’s involvement 
in the peacekeeping missions or post-conflict missions, particularly in the Balkans, Africa 
and Afghanistan were significant in that respect due to cultural or religious ties.  
 Turkey upholds multilateral efforts in arms control and disarmament as well as 
the efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery 
systems. The conflicts in Turkey’s neighborhood fuel the drives for armament, especially 
of WMD and missiles. Turkey is party to the treaties, conventions, international 
                                                 
27Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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organizations and agreements that aim at preventing the spread of these weapons and 
their delivery systems.  
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis can only be a summary of a complete analysis of Turkey’s foreign 
and security, which can be studied with variables in international, state and domestic 
levels. It has not touched to contentious issues in detail, because they need a broader 
analysis with the help from different disciplines, particularly history. It is important for 
the uninformed reader that Turkey’s geopolitical situation does not allow the country to 
have a detached stance in its policy, and to pursue a unidimensional or unidirectional 
policy.    
